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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code, this Court has jurisdiction of 
this case which is an appeal of a domestic relations case from the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue #1 
1. Being in contempt of a lower court order, does Mr. Cummings have 
"unclean hands", and is he therefore, barred from seeking equitable relief? Should his 
appeal be dismissed? 
Standard of Review 
This court stated the standard in its 1990 opinion in the case of DyAston v. 
D'Aston} 
"Appellate courts from other jurisdictions have dismissed the civil appeals 
of contumacious parties without allowing the parties an opportunity to bring 
themselves into compliance with the trial court's order.. . . These courts 
justify the dismissal of the appeals on the ground that it violates the 
principles of justice to allow a party who flaunts the orders of the courts to 
seek judicial assistance...." 
"The United States Supreme Court considered an appellate court's 
1
 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
1 
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dismissal of a civil appeal on the basis that the appellant was in contempt of 
the trial court's order in National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. 
Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954). . . The United States Supreme Court found no 
constitutional violation, stating that "[w]hile a statutory review is important 
and must be exercised without discrimination, such a review is not a 
requirement of due process." Id. at 43. The Court stressed that "[petitioner's 
appeal was not dismissed because of petitioner's failure to satisfy a 
judgment pending an appeal from it. It was dismissed because of 
petitioner's failure to comply with the court's order to safeguard petitioner's 
assets from dissipation pending such appeal."" 
Issue #2 
2. Are Mr. Cummings' claims barred by the issue preclusion aspect of the 
doctrine of Res Judicata? 
Standard of Review 
The elements of doctrine of Res Judicata were outlined most recently in this 
court's 1996 decision in the case of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson,2 
which states; 
"The issue preclusion branch of res judicata has four requirements: 
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the 
case at hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment 
on the merits in the previous action. Third, the issue must have been 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must 
have been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action." 
2
 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 1996). 
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Issue #3 
3. Is Mr. Cummings' appeal a "frivolous appeal" as described in Rule 33 
U.R.A.P.? Should double costs and fees be awarded? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review is stated in Rule 33 U.R.A.P., and states; 
"Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's 
fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right 
in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that 
will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper." 
t Issue #4 
4. Should Mrs. Cummings be awarded her costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
defending on appeal for motions grounded in common law? 
3 
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Standard of Review 
The standard of review is statutory, and is as follows; 
"(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay 
the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of 
the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. 
The order may include provision for costs of the action." 
This includes subsequent successful defenses on appeal. 
"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to the party who 
then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. On the issue of "frivolous appeal", the determinative provision is Rule 33 
U.R.A.P. which states: 
"Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's 
fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right 
in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
4 
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reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that 
will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper." 
2. With regard to the issue of attorneys fees being awarded based on common 
law, the determinative provision is Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 which in pertinent part 
states: 
"(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay 
the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of 
the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. 
The order may include provision for costs of the action." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is Mr. Cummings' second appeal. He has previously appealed Judge 
Iwasaki's original Decree of Divorce and Findings. He now appeals Judge Iwasaki's 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand and Amended Decree of 
Divorce on Remand. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The original Decree of Divorce was entered in this case in April 1995. Mr. 
5 
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Cummings filed an appeal to this court. In that appeal, Mr. Cummings claimed that the 
court's distribution of property was unfair and unequal. 
This court affirmed Judge Iwasaki's Findings and Decree via its Memorandum 
Decision dated December 19th, 1996. The Memorandum Decision remanded the case 
back to Judge Iwasaki for further Findings on two narrow issues. Those being issues as 
to the treatment of retained earnings in valuing the business owned by the parties known 
as C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc, and the overall value of the business itself. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
After receiving this court's Memorandum Decision, on remand, Judge Iwasaki first 
determined that he would take new evidence and publish new Findings. Then he 
conducted a hearing, which continued over portions of three separate days, to determine 
the fair market value of the business, and the status of retained earnings. 
At the conclusion of those days of hearing, Judge Iwasaki determined that his prior 
finding concerning the value of the business was in error. He also determined that the 
retained earnings had no separate value, and should be included in the valuation of the 
business. He found that the true value of the business, including retained earnings, was 
less than the amount originally used in the calculation of the property distribution. 
He then published Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand 
which incorporated his new findings on the value of the business, and made adjustments 
6 
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to the property distribution based on those Amended Findings. Those Amended Findings 
increased Mr. Cummings' share of the marital estate. An Amended Decree of Divorce on 
Remand, incorporating the Amended Findings, was signed by Judge Iwasaki on May 
27th, 1998. 
Mr. Cummings now, seeks to have this court review in this, his second appeal, not 
the Judge's Findings as to the value of the retained earnings or the business. Instead, Mr. 
Cummings asks this court to reconsider the broader issue of the overall property 
distribution. That distribution has previously been decided fairly and finally on the merits 
by this court, and is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All Footnote references are to page numbers of the original record. Some of the 
references are to pages of documents also included in the Addendum.) 
This is a divorce action. Mrs. Cummings filed for divorce in August of 1992.3 
Because Mr. Cummings would not participate in the discovery process,4 after six 
3
 Record on Appeal 000007 
4
 Record on Appeal 001266 
7 
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hearings,5 it was ultimately ordered by the lower court that his Answer be stricken and his 
default entered.6 Original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce were signed April 7th, 1995.7 Mr. Cummings appealed the decision of the trial 
court. 
While the matter was on appeal, the mortgage obligation on an $800,000.00 
business building, which had been awarded to Mrs. Cummings, but which Mr. Cummings 
was ordered to pay, became due in full.8 After a series of hearings, Mr. Cummings was 
compelled to obtain new financing, to stop foreclosure.9 He obtained an 18 month 
interest payment only loan to tide him over until his appeal could be decided. 
In the meantime, Mr. Cummings5 appeal was considered by this court, and the 
decision of the lower court was affirmed almost completely.10 Two items were remanded 
for further consideration by the District Court. The District Court was instructed to make 
new Findings, and take new evidence if necessary, and to explain the value of the 
5
 Record on Appeal 001266 
6
 Record on Appeal 001269 
7
 Record on Appeal 001311, also Addendum "A" and "B" 
8
 Record on Appeal 001637 
9
 Record on Appeal 001644 
10
 Record on Appeal 002152, also Addendum "C" 
8 
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business, and separately, the issue of the value of the retained earnings.11 
Judge Iwasaki commenced remand hearings in the Fall of 1997. He concluded that 
the retained earnings did not have value separate from the business itself,12 and that the 
business was worth $481,816.0013 rather than the $600,000.00 value which had been 
previously assigned to it in the original Findings.14 
Judge Iwasaki amended his Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on remand, 
and amended his Decree of Divorce, making the necessary adjustment to the property 
distribution. He awarded Mr. Cummings a one quarter interest in business building 
previously awarded in its entirety to Mrs. Cummings, to even up the property 
distribution.15 
In the meantime, Mr. Cummings, not being happy with the decision of this court in 
its Memorandum Decision, and being unsatisfied with the outcome of the remand 
hearings, refused to pay the balloon payment owing on the underlying mortgage on the 
business building when it became due at the end of the 18 month refinance period. The 
building, which was then owned after the remand hearings, three-quarters by Mrs. 
11
 Record on Appeal 002153, also Addendum "C" 
12
 Record on Appeal 002614 sub paragraph D, also Addendum "E" 
13
 Record on Appeal 002614 sub paragraph D, also Addendum "E" 
14
 Record on Appeal 001299, also Addendum "A" 
15
 Record on Appeal 002623 through 002625, also Addendum "E" 
9 
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Cummings and one-quarter by him, immediately went into default in the Fall of 1997.16 
Mr. Cummings had little incentive to obey the court's orders because even in 
acquiring a one quarter interest in the building as a result of the remand hearings, the 
amount of money he owed on the mortgages had climbed from $240,607.0217 at the time 
of the original Decree of Divorce, to over $321,684.00 (as of March 17th, 1998).18 The 
interest in the building he had obtained in remand hearings was not equal to what he owed 
on the building. 
Mr. Cummings filed an affidavit with the court stating that he could not refinance 
it. During the default period, the mortgage thereon began to earn interest at the default 
rate which was 24% per anum. 
Mrs. Cummings first asked the court to hold Mr. Cummings in contempt for not 
paying the underlying Note as he was ordered to do in both the original Decree of 
Divorce, and the Amended Decree of Divorce on Remand.19 The court took the question 
of contempt under advisement. Mrs. Cummings then asked the court for permission to 
either sell the property to stay off foreclosure,20 or the right to obtain refinancing on her 
16
 Record on Appeal 002291 and 002310 
17
 Record on Appeal 002349 
18
 Record on Appeal 002382 
19
 Record on Appeal 00289 
20
 Record on Appeal 002318 
10 
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own.21 These motions were granted.22 Mrs. Cummings then asked the court to approve a 
specific loan which she had negotiated with Bank One. She also asked that Mr. 
Cummings be ordered to close on the loan, which the court did order him to do.23 Mrs. 
Cummings also asked the court to order Mr. Cummings to make monthly interest 
payments of $2,816.67 per month so that the missed payments and default interest on the 
underlying mortgage obligation would not eat up her equity in the building during the 
foreclosure. Judge Iwasaki granted the motion.24 Mrs. Cummings also asked the District 
Court to order Mr. Cummings to pay into trust $14,083.35 which was the amount of 
interest the loan had already increased by due to Mr. Cummings' failure to make 
payments. This motion was granted.25 Mrs. Cummings also asked the District Court to 
order Mr. Cummings to pay into trust a $39,000.00 penalty amount to be paid to the 
mortgage holder for the penalty provided for in the Note and mortgage which had become 
due because Mr. Cummings failed to pay the loan. This was also ordered.26 
Mr. Cummings refused to close on the financing with Bank One that had been 
21
 Record on Appeal 002373 paragraph 2 
22
 Record on Appeal 002373 
23
 Record on Appeal 002654, also Addendum "D" 
24
 Record on Appeal 002477 
25
 Record on Appeal 002477 
26
 Record on Appeal 002478 
11 
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approved by the District Court, and which he had been ordered to close on.27 He did not 
pay any of the sums of money into trust, either the monthly sum of $2,816.67,28 the 
arrearage sum of $14,083.35,29 or the penalty sum of $39,000.00.30 
Because Mr. Cummings did not obey any of these orders, no financing was 
obtained, and ultimately the building had to be sold to avoid foreclosure.31 It was sold on 
September 21st, 1998, for $805,000.00.32 
Mrs. Cummings brought an action against Mr. Cummings for contempt which was 
heard over a period of three days in the Fall of 1998. Ultimately, Mr. Cummings was 
held in contempt for his failure to obey court orders, sentenced to serve twenty days 
incarceration and ordered to pay $7,787.80 in attorneys fees as sanctions.33 
Mrs. Cummings has subsequently obtained a judgment against Mr. Cummings for 
the difference between what she should have received from the sale of the building, and 
Record on Appeal 002922 paragraph 3, also Addendum "G" 
Record on Appeal 002926, also Addendum "G" 
Record on Appeal 002926, also Addendum "G" 
Record on Appeal 002926, also Addendum "G" 
Record on Appeal 002925, also Addendum "G" 
Record on Appeal 002883 
Record on Appeal 002928, also Addendum "G" 
12 
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what she actually got, in the amount of $250,661.31.34 She has received a separate 
judgment against Mr. Cummings for $11,812.02.35 
Mr. Cummings has now filed a second appeal on the court's Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue #1 
1. Mr. Cummings5 appeal should be dismissed. 
Mr. Cummings has, since he filed his Notice of this second appeal, been held in 
contempt by Judge Iwasaki for his failure to obey the trial court's orders. Specifically, he 
first failed to pay for, and then failed to cooperate to refinance the major asset of the 
parties, that being a piece of real estate which served as the cite of the parties' business. 
Because Mr. Cummings failed to obey the court's orders to first pay for said building, or 
second to cooperate to refinance it, it had to be sold to avoid foreclosure. For this 
behavior, Mr. Cummings has been held in contempt, sentenced to serve thirty days in jail, 
and ordered to pay his former wife $7,787.80 as a sanction to reimburse her for attorneys 
34
 Addendum "H" 
35
 Addendum "I" 
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fees. 
Mr. Cummings has attempted to destroy the very marital assets he says Judge 
Iwasaki did not fairly distribute. He has played "dog in the manger" here, taking the "if I 
can't have it, I will destroy it so she can't have it" approach. 
Because he did not pay for the real estate as ordered, he now owes his former wife 
large amounts of money. These have now been reduced to judgments against him. One 
for $250,661.31, and one for $11,812.02. These judgments cannot be satisfied. 
Mr. Cummings asks this court to do equity, but has unclean hands. His appeal is 
without merit either procedurally, or on the merits. This appeal is brought in bad faith. 
Mr. Cummings is not entitled to an appeal as a matter of right as determined by the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards 
v. Arnold, 348 US 47 (1954). His appeal should be dismissed not because of "his failure 
to satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from it", but "because of his failure to comply 
with the court's order to safeguard the Petitioner's assets from dissipation pending such 
an appeal". {National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 US 47 (1954)) 
Issue #2 
2. Reconsideration of Mr. Cummings' claims are barred by the doctrine of Res 
Judicata. On the merits, the adjustment to the personal property distribution is fair. 
14 
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Mr. Cummings' appeal is nothing more than a request that this court reconsider its 
affirmation of Judge Iwasaki's property distribution as a result of the last appeal. 
In Mr. Cummings' first appeal, he argued that Judge Iwasaki's Findings were 
unsupported by the evidence although he did not even attempt to marshal the evidence to 
support that claim. He argued that the court had not made a 50/50 division of the 
property. This court, with the exception of the narrow issue referred to above, affirmed in 
its entirety the lower court's decision including the property distribution. 
The issue challenged in this second appeal is identical to the issue previously 
appealed by Mr. Cummings in his first appeal. This court's decision in the previous 
appeal was a full, final, fair judgment on the merits. This issue has been completely, fully 
and fairly litigated in the previous action, and Mr. Cummings is exactly the same party 
against whom this doctrine of issue preclusion and res judicata is now invoked. 
Mr. Cummings does not bother to bring to this court's attention any of the 
transcript from the proceedings of the remand hearing. He does not claim that the Judge's 
decision as to the value of the business on remand was unfair or improper. What he seeks 
to do is re-litigate the general property distribution which has been already affirmed. 
••••. •.';.•- Issue #3 / 
3. Mr. Cummings'appeal is frivolous. 
15 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Cummings' appeal is a frivolous appeal as described in Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is frivolous because it is not grounded in fact, and not 
warranted by existing law, and not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse existing law. 
Mr. Cummings and his counsel both know that their Brief on Appeal does not call 
into question any of Judge Iwasaki's Findings concerning the value of the business at the 
remand hearing, or the adjustments made to the division of personal property based on 
those new Findings. This appeal is simply an attempt to present to this court, and have 
them consider again the overall property distribution that was made in the original 
Decree, which this court has already affirmed. 
No argument is made in Mr. Cummings' brief that the law which bars them from 
appealing the same issue twice should be changed. Mr. Cummings' Brief on Appeal 
seeks to confuse the court and present the property distribution issue to the court on 
appeal as though it is a matter of first impression. This attempt on Mr. Cummings' part is 
interposed for delay purposes only, and Mrs. Cummings should be awarded double costs 
and fees. 
Issue #4 
4. Mrs. Cummings should be awarded costs and fees. 
16 
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Mrs. Cummings was the prevailing party in the court below. She was awarded 
attorneys fees as part of her first Decree of Divorce. Since the Decree of Divorce, Mr. 
Cummings has had attorneys fees awarded against him on at least eight occasions. 
Ultimately, Mr. Cummings was held in contempt for his failure to obey the court's orders. 
Mrs. Cummings, being the prevailing party in the court below, having previously 
been awarded fees, and having successfully defended the court's distribution of property 
once before, should be awarded her attorneys fees on common law grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue #1 • 
1. Mr. Cummings'appeal should be dismissed. 
Mr. Cummings' appeal should be dismissed because Mr. Cummings comes before 
this court in bad faith, with unclean hands. He asks this court to do equity, but he has not 
done equity. He has sabotaged and dissipated the very marital estate he asks this court to 
re-divide, and has been held in contempt by the trial court for doing so. He has been 
sentenced to serve a period of incarceration, and pay attorneys fees of $7,787.80 in 
connection with said contempt. 
In the original Decree of Divorce, Mr. Cummings was ordered to pay the mortgage 
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on the candy company store. He appealed every aspect of the first Decree. While he was 
preparing his first appeal brief, a balloon payment on that mortgage became due, and he 
refused to pay it. After numerous motions brought by Mrs. Cummings and heard by 
Judge Iwasaki, pressure was brought to bear on him to refinance. Mr. Cummings 
obtained refinancing on the candy company mortgage for 18 months. Not a permanent 
refinancing, but a financing which he thought would get him through his first appeal. 
When this court's decision on remand was published, affirming the lower court on 
almost all points, Mr. Cummings was frustrated and disappointed. During the period of 
time in which remand hearings were being held, the refinanced 18 month interim loan 
against the candy store became due in full. 
Mr. Cummings could see that he had not obtained on appeal what he had wanted, 
and that he was not going to change the Divorce Decree significantly as a result of the 
remand hearings. When the mortgage balance became due again at the end of the 18 
month second loan, Mr. Cummings flatly refused to pay it. 
The candy company building was awarded to Mrs. Cummings in the Decree of 
Divorce. It was, by the time of the remand hearings, worth $805,000.00. Because Mr. 
Cummings did not make the mortgage payments thereon as he was ordered to do, the 
property went into foreclosure. 
Through a series of hearings, Mrs. Cummings sought to have Mr. Cummings held 
in contempt for not paying the debt, or otherwise stop foreclosure. Judge Iwasaki took 
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the matter under advisement. Mrs. Cummings then asked the court for permission to list 
the property for sale, or to obtain refinancing on her own. Mr. Cummings filed an 
affidavit claiming he could not get refinancing and could not pay the debt. Judge Iwasaki 
granted Mrs. Cummings the option to do either one as she might choose. 
Mrs. Cummings, who wanted to keep the building and did not want to sell it, 
arranged for financing with Bank One, Utah. Mrs. Cummings caused a hearing to be held 
before Judge Iwasaki on May 19th, 1998. At that time, a Bank Officer from Bank One, 
Utah, came to court and testified that a loan, which would save the building from 
foreclosure was approved by the bank and that Bank One would refinance. Judge Iwasaki 
specifically approved the loan, and ordered Mr. Cummings to attend a closing, and sign 
the necessary documents to close the loan. 
This building, (by the time of the remand hearings), worth $805,000.00, was the 
largest single marital asset of the parties. As a result of remand hearings, Mr. Cummings 
was awarded a 25% interest in the candy company building. Mr. Cummings' sole and 
separate obligation to pay the debt on the building however, was not changed. 
The debt obligation Mr. Cummings had on the building, which he was not paying, 
was increasing with interest in default at the rate of $170.00 per day, or $5,100.00 per 
month. By the time Mrs. Cummings sold the building to stop foreclosure, because Mr. 
Cummings would not close on the refinancing, his debt thereon had gone from 
$240,000.00 at the time of the original divorce to $358,678.69. By the time new 
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financing had been approved, Mr. Cummings' debt on the building exceeded the value of 
the one quarter interest in the $805,000.00 building he had just been awarded on remand. 
Mr. Cummings was not satisfied with this court's original decision on appeal, or 
Judge Iwasaki's adjustments on remand, and simply and utterly refused to sign the 
documents at closing in direct violation of Judge Iwasaki's order. 
As a result, Mrs. Cummings was forced, in order to save the property from 
foreclosure, to sell the property. It was sold on September 21st, 1998 for $805,000.00. 
After the debt, which Mr. Cummings was solely obligated to pay was subtracted from the 
sale proceeds along with costs of sale proceeds, the net to Mrs. Cummings was 
$387,773.95. Mrs. Cummings should have received from the sale $603,750.00, and 
would have if Mr. Cummings had obeyed the original court order to pay the debt on the 
building. 
Mrs. Cummings has since been awarded judgments for the difference between 
what she should have received from the sale of the building, and what she actually 
received based on Mr. Cummings' failure to obey court orders plus attorneys fees. That 
judgment is in the amount of $250,661.31. That judgment has not been satisfied, because 
Mr. Cummings is hiding assets. 
Mr. Cummings' unwillingness to obey the court's order to refinance the candy 
company building, was a direct, conscious, and willful sabotage by Mr. Cummings of 
Mrs. Cummings' efforts to refinance and save the building from foreclosure. His purpose 
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was to destroy the value of the marital estate. 
This was brought to the attention of Judge Iwasaki in a Motion for Contempt. That 
motion for contempt was heard over a series of three days. As a result, Judge Iwasaki 
made Findings of Fact and entered an Order, which was signed December 1st, 1998. 
Mrs. Cummings understands that long, tedious quotations of lower court orders in 
briefs should be avoided when possible. The circumstances of this case however, require 
a close look at the Findings on Contempt. 
With regard to Mr. Cummings' behavior, Judge Iwasaki found; 
" 1 . This Court ordered Mr. Cummings at the hearing held February 17th, 
1998, to 
"cooperate with the Plaintiff in her attempts to obtain refinancing to 
stop foreclosure." 
2. This Court subsequently approved a specific loan negotiated 
by the Plaintiff, and ordered the parties to close on the loan. 
3. . . . on the date set for closing, Mr. Cummings attended the 
closing, but would not sign the Deed of Trust and would not acknowledge 
the Lease signed by the board of directors of C. Kay Cummings Candies. 
4. . . . Mr. Cummings stated in his testimony that one of his 
reasons for not acknowledging the lease at closing, was that there was 
ambiguity on the face of the lease in that the language said that it was a 
triple-net lease, but other places in the lease indicated that the landlord 
would pay property taxes and other items. 
5. The Court finds that this reason given by the Defendant is 
disingenuous, that testimony is lacking in credibility. He did not ask about 
or try to clear up the claimed ambiguity in the lease. The court finds that 
Mr. Cummings did not acknowledge the lease on the date of closing 
because he wanted better lease terms, similar to those that had been offered 
to him earlier, during a period of negotiation between the parties, and prior 
to the Court's Order setting the fair market lease value of the premises. 
6. The Court finds that the Defendant's contention that he did 
not acknowledge the lease at the time of closing, was because a lease had 
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been signed by a man named Gearle Brooks, whom he had never appointed 
to the Board of Directors, is specious and without merit. The Court further 
finds that this stated reason for not acknowledging the lease, and closing the 
loan was again motivated by his desire for better lease terms, and a belief 
on his part that by sabotaging the financing, he could extract from the 
Plaintiff either better lease terms, or a more favorable settlement of the 
case 
11. The Court finds that Mr. Cummings5 failure to cooperate in 
signing the Deed of Trust and the document acknowledging the lease 
referred to above, caused the financing which Mrs. Cummings was granted 
the exclusive right to negotiate, and the financing which the Court had 
specifically approved, to be lost, and the deal to not close. The Court 
further finds that the five year lease required by Bank One, who offered the 
financing the Court had approved, was the only option the parties had, and 
that financing could not be obtained without such a lease. The Court finds 
that Mr. Cummings knew that, and intentionally failed to acknowledge the 
lease at the time of closing for the purposes of sabotaging the loan. The 
Court finds that Mr. Cummings' sabotage of the loan was in violation of the 
Court's order that he cooperate to close the loan, and that he did so for the 
purposes of trying to obtain leverage in negotiations with Mrs. Cummings 
to obtain better terms than he has obtained by the Court's orders as 
contained in the Amended Decree of Divorce on Remand, and by 
subsequent Court order concerning the fair market lease value of the 
property and other orders.... 
13. The Court in making these findings notes that Mr. Cummings 
previously had his answer stricken and his default entered in the underlying 
divorce matter because he would not cooperate in the discovery process in 
divorce. The Court specifically does not consider Mr. Cummings' prior 
acts resulting in his default, in its findings on contempt. The Court does 
however, as described in Rule 404(b) consider Mr. Cummings' history in 
considering proof of the contempt alleged with regard to motive, 
opportunity, intent, his plan, and when considering the evidence concerning 
absence of mistake or accident. 
14. This Court ordered Mr. Cummings on April 13th, 1998, to do 
a number of things. They were; 
A. To pay the sum of $2.816.67 per month into a trust account, 
in the place of the monthly payments he had been previously 
making on the Note to Cohen and Rappaport. 
B. To pay the sum of $14.083.35 for the arrearages on the Note 
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which had arisen between November 1997 and March 1998. 
C. To pay the sum of $39.000.00 which was the penalty he 
incurred when he allowed the loan on the building which he 
was ordered to pay to go into foreclosure. 
D. In that Mr. Cummings' testimony at the time was that the 
holders of the note would not accept payment for fear of a 
novation, Mr. Cummings was further ordered on April 13th, 
1998. to either pay these to the note holder, or: 
" . . . in the alternative, into a separate trust account to be 
established by the parties to hold said monies for the benefit 
of the Plaintiff... " 
E. Further, he was ordered to pay said amounts "as soon as 
possible." 
F. At a subsequent hearing on May 19th, 1998, Mr. Cummings 
was ordered, when he had failed to set up a payment schedule, 
or make any proposal for payment to; 
"The Defendant has until July 15th, 1998 to establish a 
* payment schedule for the payment of the remainder of 
the monies he was ordered to pay.. ." 
15. Based on the uncontroverted evidence at trial, the Court finds 
that Mr. Cummings did not pay any amount on the $2,816.67 per month 
obligation ordered. 
16. He did not pay any amount on the $14,000.00 obligation 
ordered. 
17. He did not pay any amount on the $39,000.00 amount 
ordered. 
18. He did not set up a trust account in which to put said monies 
if he had paid them. 
19. He did not make any proposal to opposing counsel for 
payment of these sums of money before or after July 15th, 1998. 
20. The Court specifically does not find that Mr. Cummings had 
the ability to pay all of these amounts of money. The Court does however, 
find that Mr. Cummings could have paid something on these amounts and 
that specifically, he had the ability to pay the $2,816.67 per month as 
ordered. 
21. The Court further finds that Mr. Cummings could have set up 
the trust account that he was ordered to set up, could have made a proposal 
for payment to opposing counsel, and could have paid something on the 
$14.000.00 amount, and the $39.000.00 amount that he was ordered to pay. 
23 
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The Court further finds that Mr. Cummings did not even attempt or try to 
obey any of these orders." [Emphasis added] 
In 1990, this court decided the case of D'Aston v. D Aston. In that case, this court 
reviewed the question of whether or not it could dismiss an appeal for failure of an 
appellant party to obey a lower court order, and stated that; 
"it violates the principals of justice to allow a party who flaunts the order of 
the courts to seek judicial assistance." 
In the D Aston decision, this court noted that the United States Supreme Court has 
considered the question of whether or not a state appellate court's dismissal of a civil 
appeal on the basis that the appellant was in contempt of a trial court's order violated the 
appellant's constitutional rights. In that case, National Union of Marine Cooks & 
Stewards v. Arnold, 348 US 37 (1954), the United States Supreme Court found that no 
constitutional violation occurred in dismissing such an appeal stating that; 
"While a statutory review is important and must be exercised without 
discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process." 
In the D Aston case, this court, realizing that it was not a violation of the due 
process rights of the appellant D'Aston to deny him an appeal, nevertheless, decided that 
the best, and measured, approach was to stay Mr. D'Aston's appeal until he brought 
himself into compliance with the lower court's order. This was a well-reasoned and 
moderate approach to the problem in the D Aston case. 
In the instant case however, no such moderation is warranted, and the option of 
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having Mr. Cummings come into compliance is not available to either of the parties, or 
the court. 
At this point, it must be said that Mr. Cummings has not cooperated, or been 
willing to participate injudicial processes from the beginning. All of his efforts have 
been to obstruct and delay. He has been unwilling to obey court orders. To quote Judge 
Iwasaki concerning Mr. Cummings: 
A. His testimony is disingenuous. 
B. His testimony lacks credibility. 
C. His arguments are specious and without merit. 
D. He has intentionally failed to acknowledge the Lease at the time of 
closing for the purpose of sabotaging the loan. 
E. He has had the motive, intent and plan to engage in contemptuous 
behavior. It has not been the result of mistake or accident. 
There is nothing Mr. Cummings can do to come into compliance with the District 
Court order. The building is lost. Mrs. Cummings received only $387,773.95 out of the 
i 
candy company building. She should have received $603,750.00. The judgment she has 
subsequently received for the difference between what she got out of the building and 
what she should have received, is uncollectible. Mr. Cummings has had time since the i 
divorce began in August 1992, to dissipate and hide his assets, and he has successfully 
done so. 
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Mr. Cummings has flaunted the order of the lower court, has engaged in 
obstructive, disingenuous behavior, has not done equity, has unclean hands, and is not 
entitled to equity, and no moderate response to this behavior by this court can remedy the 
situation. 
Mr. Cummings' appeal should be dismissed. 
Issue #2 
2. Mr. Cummings' claim that this court should divide the property of the 
parties differently than it is currently ordered, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
In Mr. Cummings' first appeal brief, he claimed that the court had not divided the 
property of the parties equitably. He cited many of the same cases he cites in his current 
appeal brief for the proposition that a trial court should make an equitable division of 
property in a divorce proceeding. Mrs. Cummings agrees that trial courts should make 
equitable distributions. 
In his first appeal brief, on the page "i" thereof, in which he identified the issues 
for appeal, he stated that issue number "III" on appeal was "The trial court abused its 
discretion in dividing the marital estate." 
On page 32 of his first appeal he presented his argument on said issue. 
The result of that appeal was the court's Memorandum Decision which states in 
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pertinent part; 
"The other issues raised by appellant are likewise within the discretion of 
the trial court, with the possible exception of the treatment of the retained 
earnings in valuing the business, and the valuation of the business itself 
Valuation and division of marital property will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion, and as long as they are supported by adequate 
factual findings to reveal the basis for the trial court's conclusions. 
Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah App. 1993). In this case, 
the findings of fact do not sufficiently explain the court's "equitable and 
50/50 division" of the marital property in that the findings fail to address 
how much, if any, of the previously-taxed retained earnings that were 
awarded to defendant may have also been included in the value of the 
business. It is unclear whether, in deciding this issue, the trial court actually 
considered the report of the court-appointed expert. The findings also lack 
sufficient detail as to how the court arrived at its valuation of the business. 
See id. 
We affirm in part, but remand for additional findings of fact on the 
aforementioned issues. The trial court may base its findings on the 
evidence now in the record, or it may wish to take additional evidence." 
Mr. Cummings' claim in this appeal is that this court should review and alter the 
entire property distribution. This is an attempt on Mr. Cummings' part to take a "second 
bite at the apple". Mr. Cummings cleverly presents this in his brief as though the issue 
was not reviewed the first time, or that somehow the issues have changed, but they have 
not. 
The only issues this court asked Judge Iwasaki to revisit on remand were the 
questions of whether the retained earnings had been improperly valued separately from 
i 
the business, and the value of the business itself. 
On remand, Judge Iwasaki determined that the retained earnings of the business 
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did not have value separate from the business. The retained earnings had been valued in 
the original Decree at $288,946.00. He determined that the overall value of the business 
was $481,816.00. This was a reduction in the value attributed to the business down from 
$600,000.00. The overall effect on the value of the marital estate was to reduce its value 
from $2,005,612.00 to $1,598,782.00. The change in the Findings required an adjustment 
to the overall distribution of property so as to make it equal, or close to equal. 
Mrs. Cummings had been awarded in the original Findings and Decree of Divorce: 
"a. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Ave., Salt Lake 
City, Utah, in align with the value; Value: $127,000.00 
b. The ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which is the real estate on which the business building is located and the 
business is operated; Value: $105,000.00 
c. The building located at 2057 East 3300 South on the above described 
land on which the business is located; Value: $587,748.00 
d. One half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors investment 
accounts with values totaling $227,918.00, or $113,959.00 to her. 
e. All personal property currently located in the home and real estate at 
1134 Herbert Avenue, including the jewelry in the Defendant's possession 
(the collateral), with the exception of the stamp collection and coin 
collection. Estimated value at the time of hearing: $25,000.00 
TOTAL TO PLAINTIFF: $997,707.00" 
Mr. Cummings had been previously awarded the following: 
"a. All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, and other 
personal property of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., including Blue Sky, 
the van, and the ongoing right to operate the business in the name of C. Kay 
Cummings Candy, Inc. plus the previously taxed income retained by the 
business. 
Retained Earnings: (previously taxed) $288,946.00 
Business Value: (without real estate) $600,000.00 
Total Estimated Value: $888,946.00 
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b. All the Defendant's clothing and personal effects and personal 
property currently in his possession including the stamp and coin 
collections; but not the jewelry referred to above; 
Value: $5,000.00 
c. One half of Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and 
retirement accounts; Value: $113,959.00 
TOTAL TO DEFENDANT: $1,007,905.00" 
As can be seen from the lists immediately above, the distribution was roughly 
equal. 
Subsequent to the remand hearings, in determining that the business was worth 
only $481,816.00, including retained earnings, an adjustment needed to be made to give 
Mr. Cummings more of the marital estate. To accomplish that, a one quarter interest in 
the real estate was taken from Mrs. Cummings and given to Mr. Cummings. The 
resulting distribution was included in the "Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on Remand" and states: 
"TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
a. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Ave., Salt Lake 
City, Utah, in align with the value; Value: $127,000.00 
b. A 75% interest in the ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, which is the real estate on which the business building is 
located and the business is operated; Value: $78,750.00 
c. A 75% interest in the building located at 2057 East 3300 South on 
the above described land on which the business is located; 
Value: $440,811.00 
d. One half of the Smith Barney and First Western advisors investment 
accounts with values totaling $227,918.00, or $113,959 to her. 
e. All personal property currently located in the home and real estate at 
1134 Herbert Avenue, including the jewelry in the Defendant's possession 
(the collateral), with the exception of the stamp collection and coin 
collection. Estimated value at the time of hearing: $25,000.00 
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TOTAL TO PLAINTIFF $785,520.00 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
a. All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, and 
other personal property of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., including Blue 
Sky, the van, and the ongoing right to operate the business in the name of C. 
Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. plus the previously taxed income retained by 
the business. Business Value: (without real estate) $481,816.00 
b. All the Defendant's clothing and personal effects and personal 
property currently in his possession including the stamp and coin 
collections; but not the jewelry referred to above; Value: $5,000.00 
c. One half of Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and 
retirement accounts; Value: $ 113,959.00 
d. A 25% interest in the real estate and building located at 2057 East 
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Value: $178,187.00 
TOTAL TO DEFENDANT: $778,962.00" 
By taking a 25% interest in the business building from Mrs. Cummings, and giving 
it to Mr. Cummings, the court shifted $178,187.00 from Mrs. Cummings5 award as 
contained in the first Decree to Mr. Cummings in the second Decree. This adjustment in 
the Amended Findings and Decree corrected the original Findings and Decree as directed 
by this court. The valuation figure adopted by the court as to the retained earnings and 
the business were exactly those given by David Posey, the court ordered appraiser. When 
Judge Iwasaki recalculated the amount of the reduction in the size of the overall estate, he 
made the appropriate adjustments to make the property distribution equal. 
Conspicuous by its absence, is any discussion in the appellant's brief of the 
remand hearings. No specific complaint is made as to Judge Iwasaki's Amended 
Findings on Remand concerning the value of the business, or the retained earnings which 
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were the only subjects of the remand hearings. No complaint is articulated, that the 
court's adjustments to the previous distribution are not consistent with the new findings 
on remand. 
What Mr. Cummings does in his brief is present a chart.36 The chart was included 
in Mr. Posey's written report. This chart was admitted as part of the remand hearings in 
connection with the Accountant David Posey's testimony as to the value of retained 
earnings and the business. Mr. Posey's estimates as to the value of other marital assets 
were irrelevant. Mr. Posey's opinions as to the value of property other than the candy 
business or its retained earnings were irrelevant because those issues were not before the 
court on remand. That evidence was not considered by Judge Iwasaki in deciding what 
values to assign to the business or retained earnings. Those were the only issues before 
him on remand. 
Mr. Cummings now presents this irrelevant material as though it should have 
persuaded Judge Iwasaki to change his Findings as to the value of other marital assets not 
on remand. 
The issue preclusion branches of res judicata are clearly present in this case. 
Those issues are: 
A. The issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and the 
case at hand. 
36
 Contained in page 15 of his brief. 
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B. The issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits 
in the previous action. 
C. The issue must have been completely, fully and fairly litigated in the 
previous action. 
D. The party against whom the collateral estoppel is invoked in the 
current action must have either been a party or in privy to a party in 
the previous action.37 
A. The issue Mr. Cummings raises on appeal, is exactly the same issue he 
raised in his first appeal, and on which he lost. The property distribution contained in the 
original Decree of Divorce has been affirmed. Judge Iwasaki was only asked to 
reconsider, and perhaps publish new Findings with regard to the value of the candy 
company including retained earnings, and nothing else. He has had remand hearings, he 
has published Amended Findings, and he has made an adjustment in the original 
distribution. 
B. The issue was decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous 
action. The previous action was the first appeal in this case. It resulted in an affirmation 
of the lower court's order, and such a review by an appellate court is deemed to be a final 
judgment on the merits.38 
37
 Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1336, 1337 (Utah 1996) 
38
 Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1995) 
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C. Mr. Cummings appealed every aspect of the original Decree, including the 
fairness of the property distribution in his first appeal. He filed an Appellate Brief and a 
Reply Brief. This court published its decision via "Memorandum Decision" and Mr. 
Cummings did not move this court for reconsideration. This court's consideration 
process in handling Mr. Cummings' first appeal gave Mr. Cummings a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate his position on the merits. 
D. Mr. Cummings is exactly the same party against whom the court ruled in 
the prior appeal. 
Mr. Cummings is not entitled to a reconsideration of the overall property 
distribution now. His claims were heard and rejected in his prior appeal. 
Issue #3 
3. Mrs. Cummings should be awarded double costs and her reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
Rule 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for damages to 
an appellee who successfully defends against an appeal when it is determined that the 
appeal has been filed for delay, or is frivolous. Section (b) of Rule 33 states that: 
"For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous, motion, brief, or other paper is 
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based 
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
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appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is 
one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper." 
In this case, Mr. Cummings' second appeal to this court is not warranted by 
existing law, and is not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse 
existing law. Mr. Cummings and his current counsel filed the first appeal in this case. 
They know full well that the court's original property distribution was affirmed, except 
for the limited issues. Mr. Cummings and his counsel know that the court altered the 
distribution in the remand hearings to take into consideration the reduced value attached 
to the business and the retained earnings. Mr. Cummings and his counsel know that Mr. 
Cummings was awarded appropriately more of the marital estate as a result of the remand 
hearings. 
Mr. Cummings and his counsel know that in this second appeal, this court should 
review only alleged mistakes made on remand, and not the lower court's previously 
affirmed Findings about other property. Mr. Cummings and his counsel know of, and do 
not complain of the court's findings on remand, or the adjustments made to the original 
distribution. Instead, Mr. Cummings and his counsel complain that Judge Iwasaki did not 
go beyond the scope of the remand hearings and change his findings as to value of other 
property. 
No good faith argument can be made that the doctrine of res judicata, which is well 
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established existing law, allows a second review by this court of previously affirmed 
Findings as to the value of the other property. 
Mr. Cummings' presentation to this court of a chart included in a report from 
David Posey admitted in the remand hearings, but not referred to, and not relevant to the 
court's remand considerations, cannot be construed as a good faith attempt argument to 
extend or modify or reverse the existing law on the doctrine of res judicata. The 
presentation of this material, and the arguments made by Mr. Cummings in his current 
brief on appeal, can only be seen as an attempt to circumvent Judge Iwasaki's original 
Findings and Decree, and this court's affirmation of most of it. What Mr. Cummings is 
doing is not only not a good faith attempt, but it is a bad faith attempt, to circumvent the 
District Court and this court's previous orders, and confuse the issue. 
Mr. Cummings' brief on appeal is further an attempt to delay and to harass and 
needlessly increase the costs of litigation for Mrs. Cummings. He seeks to gain time to 
dissipate his assets. Mrs. Cummings has already obtained in the last six months, over 
$262,000.00 in judgments against Mr. Cummings which cannot be satisfied. These are 
judgments arising from Mr. Cummings' past contemptuous conduct which has decimated 
the marital estate. 
Mr. Cummings sought and obtained an 18 month bridge loan making interest 
payments only during his first appeal, and then, when the balloon payment on the 
refinancing became due during the remand hearings, let the loan go into default. The 
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result of this has been delay which created a balance due on the building which was 
greater than the one quarter share in the building he was ultimately awarded. 
Mr. Cummings was ordered to obtain refinancing and he failed. He was then 
ordered to cooperate in refinancing obtained by Mrs. Cummings and refused to. Mr. 
Cummings has been held in contempt for that behavior in connection with those Findings 
of Contempt. The trial court has found him to be disingenuous, his testimony to be 
lacking in credibility, and his position to be specious and without merit. 
Judge Iwasaki, who has been incredibly patient with Mr. Cummings, further found 
that he intentionally failed to acknowledge the Lease he was ordered to acknowledge for 
purposes of sabotaging the loan necessary to save the property. In finding Mr. Cummings 
in contempt, Judge Iwasaki also determined that Mr. Cummings had motive and 
opportunity, intent and a plan to disregard the court's orders and sabotage the marital 
estate, and that his behavior had not been due to accident or mistake. 
Mr. Cummings' behavior has been intentional. He has willfully disregarded court 
orders. He has diminished the value of the marital estate, has done so for delay purposes, 
and his appeal is without merit, and not a good faith attempt to obtain review of a 
disputed fact or law. 
This matter should be remanded again for hearings for Judge Iwasaki to assess and 
award to Mrs. Cummings double her costs, and all of her reasonable attorneys fees 
incurred in defending this appeal. 
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Issue #4 
4. Mrs. Cummings should be awarded her fees for defending this appeal based 
on common law. 
Section 30-3-3 U.C.A. (1998 as amended) allows the court to "order a party to pay 
the costs, attorneys fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees of the other 
party." There is also a line of cases characterized by Maughn v. Maughn and Burt v. 
Burt?9 which provide that; 
"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to the party who 
then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." 
In the original Decree of Divorce dated April 7th, 1995, in paragraph 8 thereof, 
Mrs. Cummings was awarded attorneys fees in the sum of $2,857.31. 
Since the original Decree of Divorce was entered, Mrs. Cummings has been the 
prevailing party, and has been awarded attorneys eight additional times. Those hearings, 
and the fees that have been awarded are as follows; 
A. Hearing date November 2, 1995, on Plaintiffs Motion to Turn Over 
Jewelry and Motion for Contempt. Attorney's fees awarded 
$500.00. 
B. Hearing date December 21, 1995, on the Plaintiffs Motion for 
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Attorney's Fees. Attorney's fees awarded $442.50. 
C. Hearing date May 13, 1996, on the Plaintiffs Motion for the Entry 
of Judgment and Contempt. Attorney's fees awarded $300.00. 
D. Hearing date April 13, 1998, on the Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt. 
Attorney's fees awarded $825.00. 
E. Hearing date May 19, 1998, on the Plaintiffs Motions for 
Establishment of a Payment Schedule, Approval of a Loan, An Order 
Requiring the Defendant to Sign a Deed of Trust, and Attorney's 
Fees. Attorney's fees awarded $500.00. 
F. Hearing dates September 21, 1998, October 14, 1998, and 
October 30, 1998, on Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt. Attorney's 
fees awarded $7,787.80. 
G. Hearing date December 29, 1998, on Plaintiffs Motion for a 
Judgment on Real Estate. Attorney's fees awarded $990.00. 
H. Hearing date March 29, 1999, on Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment. 
Attorney's fees awarded $450.00 
Mrs. Cummings not only was awarded fees in the original Decree of Divorce, but 
in all the above recited subsequent hearings in which she sought to obtain enforcement of 
the court's orders, and to prevent her former husband from dissipating the marital estate. 
Mrs. Cummings has prevailed consistently, overwhelmingly, and in a virtual non-
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stop effort which has been going on since August of 1992. All of this effort has been to 
keep her former husband from disobeying court orders, ignoring court orders, and 
dissipating the marital estate. Mr. Cummings' long history of failing to cooperate, and 
disobedience was punished with contempt and an awarded of fees on December 1st, 
1998.40 Mrs. Cummings must be deemed to have been the prevailing party below. She 
has been awarded fees over and over again. Mrs. Cummings should be awarded fees for 
defending this appeal. The case should be remanded to the trial court to determine 
appropriate fees. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Mr. Cummings comes before this court with "unclean hands" asking for 
equity. He is in contempt of a lower court order, having dissipated the very marital estate 
he now asks this court to redivide. His appeal should be dismissed. 
2. Mr. Cummings' appeal is barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata. He seeks 
to have this court revisit the property distribution which has previously been heard and 
decided against him in his prior appeal. This court's prior decisions on appeal, and Judge 
Iwasaki's Amended Decree of Divorce on Remand should be affirmed. 
3. Mr. Cummings' appeal is a "frivolous appeal" and Mrs. Cummings should 
40
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be awarded "double costs" and all her reasonably incurred fees on appeal, via remand 
hearings. 
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